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Chapter 8

Paternalism, Freedom,
Identity, and
Commitment
Donald H. Regan
Some years ago, I wrote an essay entitled "Justifications for Paternalism." 1 That
essay is here revised, and expanded by the addition of a new topic. Many readers of
the original version did not understand that the two principal sections presented
arguments that were quite independent. I would therefore emphasize that in the
present version the three principal sections (II, III, and IV) are separable one from
another. Not surprisingly, in an essay so disconnected, I reach no general
conclusions I have much confidence in. I suspect the reason for the failure is that I
have been insufficiently daring in rejecting common premises for thinking about
the problem. That, however, is a story for another time.

I
It may be useful to rehearse briefly the main points of what I take to be the standard
dialectic of paternalism. In the context of a traditional utilitarian approach to the
problem of paternalism, there is one necessary and sufficient condition for
paternalistic coercion-namely, that the coercion will result in more pleasure or
happiness overall for the person coerced. If some individual will be happier overall
if she abstains from cigarettes, or from heroin, or if she wears seat-belts in cars or a
helmet when riding a motorcycle, we should coerce her to do all those things. That
is all there is to it. But this singleminded pleasure-maximizing approach does not
satisfy us. Anyone who suggests that we are always justified in compelling people
to do that which will make them happiest is ignoring another value that is not the
same as happiness, the value of freedom of choice. Among our intuitions we seem
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to find the idea that individuals have aright to make their own choices, even if they
are bad ones. In cases in which paternalistic coercion would be justified on
utilitarian grounds, two important values, pleasure or happiness on the one hand
and freedom on the other, seem to be irreconcilably opposed.
We might try to resolve the conflict by a rule-utilitarian move. It seems
plausible to suppose that in many cases, perhaps most, individuals have a better
idea what will make them happy than do remote legislators. If that is so,
paternalistic legislation may be misguided more often than not, and a general
principle forbidding such legislation, possibly enshrined in a constitution, might
make good sense. This is significant argument. In the end, it may be the strongest
argument that can be made for a general prohibition on paternalism. 2 However, it
leaves the defense of freedom dependent on a contingency. If there is any intrinsic
value in freedom, this argument does not give that value its due. I shall therefore
eschew this and other rule-utilitarian arguments in what follows. Except where I
specify otherwise, I shall consider the question of when coercion would be
justified from the point of view of an idealized paternalist, who not only knows
everything about the individual he is coercing and the consequences of various
choices by that individual but who also has at his disposal means of coercion that
can discriminate perfectly between different individuals and different acts. My
hypothetical paternalist does not make mistakes; he need not worry about possible
overbreadth in general prohibitions; and he operates in a system in which
paternalistic legislation had no bad effects on the administration of the legal system
generally. I am ignoring serious practical problems, because it seems to me that
before we can decide what sorts of paternalism are justified in practice, we need to
have some idea of what sorts would be justified for my ideal paternalist.
We might also try to resolve the conflict between happiness and freedom by
saying that some considerable degree of freedom is a necessary condition of being
happy. Unfortunately, this claim is not obviously true-witness the cases of nuns,
soldiers, and others who manage to be happy inside total institutions- and even if
it were true it would still seem to subordinate to happiness something which is an
independent value of equal stature.
Another move, still within the standard dialectic, is more promising. It is
often suggested that paternalism may be justified when the individual coerced
lacks relevant information about the consequences of her acts. Presumably this
justification for paternalism gets its force from a feeling that ignorance is a sort of
unfreedom. Since the person who lacks information is unfree even if we do not
intervene to constrain her choice, we are not really decreasing her freedom by
intervening, and the conflict between freedom and happiness never arises. Just
why being uninformed is a way of being unfree is an interesting question.
Certainly it smacks more of a lack of "positive" freedom than of a lack of
"negative" freedom. Still, as an excuse for paternalism, ignorance is in
reasonably good repute even with advocates of negative freedom.
If our justification of paternalism is simply people's ignorance, it might
seem that we have a warrant not for coercion, but only for education. If the reason
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we feel justified in forbidding drugs is that we don't think users realize the danger
to themselves, should we not concentrate on informing them of the danger, and
then let them do as they please? In fact, there are a variety of claims we might put
forth to justify coercion in particular cases. Sometimes there simply will not be
time to educate the party coerced, as when someone threatens to act in a way that
will do her irreparable damage before we can convince her of what the facts are. In
other cases, the party to be coerced may lack the expertise to understand or use the
information she should have.
Stretching the concept of information a bit, we might suggest that even when
expertise is not in question, an individual might have all the facts within her
cognitive grasp and still not really appreciate them. For example, someone might
know all the medical facts about cigarettes, emphysema, and lung cancer, and still
fail to appreciate just how unpleasant the possible consequences of smoking are. In
a similar vein, we might suggest that most people are simply incapable of taking
very small probabilities properly into account, and this could be regarded as a sort
of ignorance about consequences. With these arguments, we can defend a good
deal of paternalism with some persuasiveness on the ground that we are interfering
only when people lack information.
Another move, similar to the appeal to ignorance, is the claim that
paternalism is justified when the subject of coercion is acting under psychological
compulsion or under unusual social pressure. In these cases also, we might claim
not to interfere with freedom, since the subject of coercion is already unfree, and
we might nonetheless open up very considerable opportunities for benevolent
intervention.
We have now reached approximately the point Gerald Dworkin reaches at
the end of his deservedly influential essay on paternalism. 3 After canvassing much
the same justifications for paternalism as those I have mentioned, Dworkin
concludes, in effect, that paternalism is acceptable so long as "we are simply using
coercion to enable people to carry out their own goals. " 4 Ignorance, psychological compulsion, or even outright weakness of will may prevent people from
achieving their goals, and paternalistic coercion is an appropriate remedy. To be
sure, Dworkin does not say we are justified in coercing the ignorant or the weakwilled just to maximize their pleasure or their happiness. He speaks rather of
enabling them to accomplish their own goals, whatever those may be. Still,
Dworkin's conclusion is troublesome, for two quite different reasons.
On the one hand, it is not clear that even after we limit paternalism as
Dworkin would limit it (to cases of ignorance and the like), we have given freedom
of choice its due. We are so seldom fully informed of the consequences of our acts,
and we are so seldom unaffected by psychological and social pressures of various
kinds, that our whole lives might be subject to paternalistic supervision if the
approach we have been expounding were taken seriously. Furthermore, this
approach fails to take into account a very important fact, which is that making
choices, including bad ones, is an essential way in which people acquire
information, learn to resist compulsion, and develop strength of will. Freedom, in
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the sense of the ability to make a genuinely free choice, is not merely something
one has or does not have at any point in time with respect to any particular choice.
It is a general capacity that one acquires and improves as one exercises it. The
achievement of freedom is impossible unless one is allowed to make some
decisions that are not fully free. To be sure, Dworkin's statement about enabling
people to carry out their own goals (and other similar statements) could be
construed as taking this need for "exercise in freedom" into account. But the
possible conflict between enabling someone to make the present choice which will
further her goals and enabling her to develop a capacity for improved choice in the
future goes unnoticed. A related point, less important but worth mentioning, is that
we may not value equally Smith's achieving her goals with paternalistic help and
Smith's achieving her goals on her own. In other words, we may think there is an
important difference between Smith's goals being achieved and Smith's achieving
them.
My other objection to the approach summarized in the quote from Dworkin
is that it assumes each person has, or can be regarded as having, something
describable as ''her'' goals. This is mildly problematic even if we consider only
the moment of the choice we propose to interfere with-few people have goals that
are fully worked out, and the vaguenesses and gaps might be important. What
really troubles me, however, is the implicit assumption that people's goals are
stable over time. People change over time, and their goals change with them. Two
of the three sections that follow will consider ways in which this fact affects the
analysis of paternalism.

II
In the preceding section, we considered one standard approach to minimizing the
conflict between our paternalistic impulses and our inclination to value freedom.
We saw that if we regard as unfree acts that are performed in ignorance, or under
pressure, or as a result of weakness of will, we can indulge in a great deal of
paternalism without interfering with freedom at all. This approach, however,
threatens to justify more paternalism than we are comfortable with.
In this section, I shall consider a quite different approach to minimizing the
conflict between our paternalistic impulses and our concern for freedom. The
approach is suggested by John Stuart Mill's discussion of a contract for slavery.
Mill says that although we generally enforce contracts, out of respect for
individuals' free choices, we should not enforce contracts for slavery. Mill writes
of the would-be slave:
[B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any
future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case,
the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of
himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no
longer the presumption in its favor, that would be afforded by his voluntarily
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remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should
be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his
freedom. 5
There is a certain looseness here. A person might have what seems to her a
very strong reason for wanting to sell herself into slavery. It might, for example, be
the only way she could secure the money for an expensive operation necessary to
save the life of her child. In such a case, a prohibition on contracts for slavery
would be a genuine barrier to achieving the person's goals. It would be a genuine
denial of freedom. 6
Still, Mill has a point. It seems quite natural to argue that even if the act of
selling oneself into slavery can be an exercise of freedom, the act in question
destroys much more freedom than would be destroyed by prohibiting the act. The
person who wants to sell herself into slavery and is not allowed to is less free in
regard to her present desire, but she will be freer, in the long run, overall.
Therefore, our valuing freedom does not weigh against prohibiting contracts for
slavery. It supports it. Whatever the basis of our original impulse to forbid the
contract for slavery, that impulse does not conflict in this case with our concern for
freedom. The apparent conflict is illusory.
What we have done, in effect, is to substitute for the deontological principle
that an agent's freedom must not be interfered with, a teleological principle that the
agent's total freedom should be maximized over time. Of course, neither the
deontological principle nor the teleological principle could be regarded as the only
principle relevant to cases of the sort we are discussing. Freedom is not all that
counts. But the point remains that a deontological principle weighs against every
paternalistic interference with the freedom of the moment, whereas the teleological principle weighs against some such interferences and supports others. The
teleological principle will conflict less often with impulses to paternalism from
other sources.
It might be objected that in substituting the teleological ''freedom-maximization" principle for the deontological "freedom-respecting" principle, we are
suggesting an unacceptable ''utilitarianism of rights.'' Whatever the general force
of this criticism, it is surely blunted here by the response that we are not invading
one person's rights to enhance another person's rights. Rather, we are invading
one person's right (if we concede so much to the objection) to enhance that same
person's total enjoyment of the same right over time. 7 In this essay, at least, I do
not recommend interpersonal freedom-maximization.
I have introduced the freedom-maximization approach in the context of the
slavery case because Mill's discussion of that case so clearly suggests it. I do not
claim that once we have formulated the freedom-maximization principle, we have
said all there is to say about the slavery case. A full discussion of contracts for
slavery would take us far beyond the topic of paternalism. Let us therefore tum to a
simpler problem.
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Consider cigarette-smoking. I am inclined to think that it would violate no
one's rights (and that it would probably be a good thing) if the sale and use of
cigarettes were prohibited. It may be that a ban on cigarettes can be justified by the
arguments considered in the first section of this paper. Many cigarette-smokers
remain ignorant about the risks of smoking. Many smokers who are aware of the
risks in some sense do not imagine them vividly or do not respond appropriately
given the small probabilities involved. Many smokers acquired the habit under
social pressure. And so on. But surely there are some smokers who are covered by
none of these arguments. Perhaps we ought really not to interfere with those
remaining smokers, or my ideal paternalist with his powers of perfect discrimination ought really not to interfere with them. I have a lingering feeling, however,
that it may be permissible to prevent cigarette-smoking even by a smoker who has
no family, who is as clear-headed and as free of neuroses as a person can be, who is
well informed about the chances of getting cancer or emphysema and the general
diminution of life expectancy, who has seen close-up the effects of cancer and
emphysema, and who just doesn't give a damn.
The freedom-maximization approach allows us to explain why it is
permissible to coerce the well-adjusted, well-informed, would-be smoker. To be
sure, the smoker does not destroy her freedom completely, as Mill's would-be
slave is trying to destroy his. But cigarette-smoking will diminish the smoker's
freedom, at least statistically speaking. It will shorten her life-expectancy and
increase the likelihood of debilitating disease. (The appeal to statistics is
somewhat inconsistent with my intention to consider the problem of paternalism
from the viewpoint of an omniscient ideal paternalist. I would concede that if the
ideal paternalist can separate those smokers who will suffer bad effects from those
who will not, he should coerce only the former. Since we in the real world are
unable to make this distinction, it is convenient to talk in terms of statistics and in
terms of all smokers suffering a statistical harm, although this raises problems that
I am going to ignore.) It seems to me that the expected loss of freedom caused by
smoking (taking into account both the magnitude of the various possible losses and
their probability) is greater than the loss imposed directly by the prohibition on
smoking.
It could be objected that smoking does not cause any loss of freedom.
Disease and death are not ordinarily regarded as ''unfreedom.'' Whatever their ill
effects, the issue of freedom is not involved. My answer to this is that we are not
trying to minimize unfreedom but to maximize freedom, and what I mean by
"freedom" in this connection includes abilities, capacities, and in general
whatever is a precondition for any human activity. What we desire is that the
largest number of people should have the widest possible range of effective choice
about what to do with themselves. From this point of view, it is clear that death and
injury and disease all diminish freedom.
The objector might persist, with the suggestion that a loss of freedom from
disease, say, is less important than an equal loss of freedom attributable to direct
paternalistic intervention. I do not necessarily deny this. I shall suggest a reason
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shortly why it might be true. For the moment, I would say that the expected loss
from smoking is so much greater than the loss from paternalistic intervention to
prohibit smoking that even if the latter is given some extra weight to reflect the fact
that it flows from external intervention and not from the natural consequences of
chosen actions, the balance still favors the paternalistic course.
An obvious difficulty with the freedom-maximizing approach is that it
assumes freedom is quantifiable, at least to some extent. It assumes that we can
compare "bundles" of freedom, and (barring omniscience) lottery tickets with
bundles of freedom as payoffs. Now, I cannot give complete directions for
comparing bundles of freedom, or lottery tickets, but I can say a few things about
how freedom is measured. First ofall, it is clear that we do not determine the extent
of a person's freedom just by counting up the actions available to her at all relevant
times and saying that the greater the number of actions, the greater her freedom.
For one thing there is no obviously satisfactory criterion for individuating actions.
More important, however, is the fact that freedom to do some things is much more
important than freedom to do others. Any criterion based on mere counting would
ignore such differences. In deciding how great a person's freedom is, we need to
consider not merely how many different things she can do, but what the things she
can do are. Freedom to do X will presumably count for more than freedom to do Y
whenever X is more pleasurable to the particular individual than Y, or m')re highly
valued by a rational individual than Y, or more essential to the individual's sense
of personal identity than Y, and so on. The considerations just listed do not exhaust
the possibilities, and each must be taken as including the qualification "other
things being equal," if only because the considerations listed might conflict for
particular values of X and Y.
It may seem that in the last paragraph I replace a nearly hopeless problem
(how to count up actions) with an utterly impossible one (how to evaluate bundles
of freedom in terms of the relative importance, according to various criteria, of the
available actions). I do not think that is the case. We are no closer to a well-defined
procedure for ranking bundles of freedom, but the new problem is more amenable
to acceptable intuitive judgments than the old one. If the criterion for ranking
bundles of freedom is simply the number of available actions, my intuition says
that almost all the bundles that arise in practice are going to contain the same
infinite number of actions, and therefore be equally valuable. My intuition also
says, however, that the conclusion that almost all bundles of freedom arising in
practice are equally valuable is ludicrous. Once the criterion is expanded to include
reference to the importance of the actions, I find that I can make some intuitive
judgments, like the one I have already revealed regarding where the "balance of
freedom'' lies if we are considering prohibiting cigarettes. 8
The notion of freedom-maximization may require judgments that are
controversial and incapable of definitive establishment, but in this respect it does
not differ from the notion of utility-maximization. Many people have been
utilitarians, and many more have agreed that utility-maximization should play
some role in moral decision-making, despite uncertainty about just what actions
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maximize utility, or even just what utility-maximization means. If the notion of
freedom-maximization strikes a responsive chord from somewhere among our
moral intuitions, perhaps we should struggle along with it just as we do with other
notions equally vague.
The freedom-maximization idea seems to me useful in other cases besides
the slavery case and the case of cigarettes. Laws against drugs like heroin and laws
requiring the use of seat-belts in cars or the wearing of helmets when riding
motorcycles present much the same problem as laws against cigarettes. My
intuition is that, in each of these cases, paternalistic intervention is likely to
maximize freedom overall.
I do not suggest, however, that we would be justified in forbidding all risky
activities. Consider mountain-climbing. Although there are substantial risks
involved in mountain-climbing, the freedom that would be lost if mountainclimbing were forbidden looms much larger, to my mind, than the freedom that is
lost if cigarettes are prohibited or seat-belts required. For one thing, mountainclimbing is likely to be much more important to people who want to climb
mountains than cigarettes are to people who want to smoke cigarettes. Climbing is
likely to be a source of greater pleasure, especially when we consider not merely
the time spent on the mountain, but time spent planning and preparing for trips,
talking to other climbers, and so on. Also, climbing is more likely to be closely
linked with the would-be participants' sense of identity. A person might describe
herself as a mountain-climber in the way that someone else would describe herself
as a chess-player, a gardener, or a philosopher. Who would think of describing
herself as a cigarette-smoker in the same way?
Beyond all of that, I am inclined to think that mountain-climbing is
intrinsically a more valuable activity than cigarette-smoking. It is no accident that
people think of themselves as mountain-climbers in a way they do not think of
themselves as cigarette-smokers. There is something about the activities themselves that accounts for this difference in attitude. Indeed, while mountainclimbing is plainly an "activity," that word seems out of place as applied to
cigarette-smoking.
The claim that some activities are intrinsically more valuable than others is
controversial. I lack both the space and the arguments to defend the claim here,
although I hope to defend it at some time in the future. Nonetheless, it is part of
what accounts for my differing reactions to mountain-climbing and cigarettesmoking; I suspect it contributes to some other people's differing reactions; and I
suggest that the reader who reflects on the ways we talk about mountain-climbing
and cigarette-smoking will be led to see some of the differences that I think make
the one intrinsically more valuable than the other.
One other problem that invites attention in a discussion of freedommaximization is the problem of suicide. In all probability, most of my readers will
share the view that suicide should not be unconditionally forbidden. And yet it
would seem that there can be no act more destructive of freedom than suicide. If we
allow suicide, what has become of freedom-maximization?

FREEDOM, IDENTITY, AND COMMITMENT

121

People want to commit suicide in various circumstances, and I have no room
here for a detailed discussion of the problem. Speaking briefly and generally, there
are two points to be made on how freedom-maximization may be reconciled with
allowing suicide. First, in any case where the would-be suicide's desire to commit
suicide persists (and I am prepared to admit that it is only in such cases, if we can
identify them, that suicide should be allowed), the freedom that will be preserved
by forbidding suicide will be substantially devalued by the possessor's lack of
interest in it and lack of inclination to put it to good use. Second, the person who is
prevented from committing suicide (and whose desire persists) is likely to be very
unhappy during her remaining life. Considerations of utility-maximization argue
in favor of allowing the suicide, and may simply outweigh considerations of
maximizing freedom. In other cases, we have often implicitly assumed that our
paternalistic impulses were prompted by utility-maximization, so we have been
arguing in effect that freedom-maximization and utility-maximization pointed in
the same direction. But they need not always do so, nor need either always prevail
over the other when they conflict.
One final observation: Although I have been discussing freedom-maximization as a principle which focuses on maximizing the range of choice available to an
individual over time (restricting choice now in order to preserve opportunities later
on), the same phrase, "freedom-maximization," could encompass an idea I
mentioned in the preceding section of the essay, namely, the idea that we want to
allow, or perhaps even help, individuals to develop the ability to make choices.
We are interested both in people's having opportunities for choice and in their
having capacities for making well-thought-out choices and sticking to them.
Unfortunately, a paternalistic intervention that will maximize opportunities for
choice in the long run may also interfere with the development of the ability to
choose.
I do not conclude that we should abandon range-of-choice-maximization. In
cases like the cigarette case, for example, the potential for an individual to learn
from her own experience is small, just because the major costs of smoking are
likely to appear long after the important initial decisions. Even here, of course, one
person may learn from the experience of another, and for any individual who will
not smoke, it is almost certainly better, on "ability-maximizing" grounds, that
she make the decision and stick to it by herself than that she do so with paternalistic
assistance. In general, this ability-maximizing aspect of freedom-maximization
may account for the feeling noted earlier that a loss of freedom as a natural
consequence of some earlier choice is not as objectionable as the loss of an equal
amount of freedom, in the range-of-choice sense, as a result of paternalistic
intervention. The first loss is more likely than the second to be educational. The
point is just that the idea of freedom-maximization is complex. Even so, it is a way
of giving content to the value (or values) of freedom that we cannot ignore.
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III
At the end of the first section of this essay, I suggested that one weakness of
traditional arguments about paternalism is an implicit assumption that people do
not change over time. In this section and the next, I shall explore some arguments
that take change over time specifically into account.
The central tenet of most arguments against paternalism is Mill's proposition
that ''the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.' ' 9
Paternalism presents a problem because it involves exercising power over an
individual, not to prevent harm to others, but to prevent harm to the individual
herself. If there were some good reason for regarding the harm done as done to a
person other than the agent, the problem would disappear. In many cases in which
paternalism seems justified there is a good reason for thinking of the harm as done
to someone other than the agent. To illustrate that reason, it will be useful to
consider a few cases, starting with one that has nothing directly to do with
paternalism.
Suppose that, ten years after the occurrence of an act of embezzlement, we
finally discover the identity of the embezzler. Suppose also that we hold a
retributivist view of punishment. A crime has been committed. We have at last
identified the criminal. It would seem that she should be punished. But when we
consider the person before us, the "criminal" we are supposed to punish, we
discover that she is a different person from the person she was ten years ago. She
squandered all her ill-gotten gains in the first six months. Since then she has lived a
blameless life. She has punctiliously fulfilled all obligations of trust. She has not
(in this hypothetical case) repaid the money she originally embezzled, but that is
because her blameless life has been a modest one, and she has had no funds to
spare. I think we would be most reluctant to punish in this case. Although the
criminal was (and perhaps timelessly is) deserving of punishment, the criminal is
no longer accessible to us. Inhabiting the criminal's body and social role, we find a
new woman. 10
Consider next a slightly different case. Imagine a smoker who smokes for
twenty years, then quits for ten, and then turns up with lung cancer, of which his
smoking is a causal antecedent. Would it not seem to us that nature has been
unfair? Perhaps someone who has smoked for twenty years has no ground for
complaint if he gets cancer, but in this case the person who gets the cancer is an
abstainer of ten years' standing. That ought to count for something.
To be sure, accusing nature of unfairness is only a manner of speaking, but it
is a manner of speaking that suggests a bridge between the problem of punishment
and the problem of paternalism. It seemed unfair to punish the reformed
embezzler. It seems "unfair" to "punish" the reformed smoker. The reason is
that in each case the person who suffers is not the person who (arguably) deserves
to. But if the reformed smoker is not the same person as the unrepentant nicotinefiend, that may be relevantto the issue of paternalism. Ifwe step in and prevent the
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would-be smoker from smoking, can we not claim that we are protecting a
different person, the smoker's later self? (It may occur to the reader that I am
skipping over some problems involving the question of whether, or under what
conditions, the smoker will or would reform. I shall discuss these problems
presently.)
Actually, I think the suggestion that the smoker becomes a different person
is an essential prop for a more standard line of argument in favor of paternalism, at
least if the standard line is to amount to anything more than straight utilitymaximization. Consider, for the sake of variety, another case in which a cyclist is
bound by a statute that makes it an offense to ride a motorcycle without wearing a
helmet. Such statutes are frequently attacked on the ground that if the cyclist wants
to run the risk of serious injury, that is her own business. A defender of the statute
is likely to respond as follows: ''Anyone who rides a motorcycle without a helmet
risks serious injury. If she is seriously injured, she is likely to become a public
charge. She will be cared for in a public hospital or, even if she can afford private
care, she will end up unemployed and drawing public compensation. This may not
happen in every case, but certainly in statistical terms the helmetless cyclist
imposes a burden on public assistance funds. Since public funds must be raised by
taxation, the helmetless cyclist hurts someone besides herself."
The argument just stated is not very satisfying. For one thing, when we
consider what the statistical burden the cyclist imposes on the public treasury
comes to, it may well be that the harm the cyclist does to others by this route is
outweighed by the utility to her of riding without a helmet. Further, the
tenuousness of the connection between the conduct and the harm gives the
argument something of the false ring of rationalization. In any case, the opponent
of the helmet statute, in order apparently to avoid the force of the argument, has
only to steel himself and say: "You go too fast. You say that the cyclist will be a
burden on public assistance funds, but the cyclist never asked for public
assistance. The cyclist I have in mind values her freedom, and she realizes that the
price of freedom is to suffer the consequences of her choices. If she suffers a
serious injury, leave her to manage as best she can. Leave her to private charity, or
let her die in the street. So long as you are prepared to do that, her riding without a
helmet doesn't hurt anyone but herself."
At this stage, the defender of the statute might reply: ''We can't leave her in
the street. That would be inhuman. It would cost us more in suffering to leave her
in the street than it would cost to care for her properly. So you see, she has harmed
us, either way." The obvious retort is: "If you value freedom at all, you must
admit that one person's mere emotional distress at another's behavior is no
justification for making that behavior a crime. If the cyclist insists on dying in a
public thoroughfare, let us remove her, as we would any other offensive
exhibitionist. But so long as she is out of the public eye, she is as entitled to die as
to read a dirty book."
In rebuttal, the defender of the statute will say: · 'It's not simply a matter of
squeamishness that makes me want to help the injured cyclist. I have a moral
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obligation to. Being denied assistance when one is injured is a punishment too
great to visit on anyone's head just for making a foolish choice, even if the choice
was precisely to risk that punishment. The cyclist may have made her original
choice with full knowledge, but she must regret it now. My general duty to h·elp
people in need would be satisfied here only if the cyclist did not want help at the
time she needs it. The fact that she decided to do without help before she needed it
is quite irrelevant.'' The defender of the statute adds that being put in a position
where one must undertake some burden or expense if one is to satisfy a moral
obligation (as opposed to reacting on the basis offeelings of pity or horror) is harm,
so the cyclist has harmed someone after all.
The defender of the statute is now in a strong position. He may have won the
argument. What remains to be observed is that if he has won the argument, he has
done so by hitting on a suggestion that makes most of the argument as I have
described it superfluous. If we really have an obligation to help the injured cyclist
regardless of whether, when she decidedto ride without a helmet, she expected
help or wanted it, the most plausible explanation is that the cyclist before the
accident and the cyclist after the accident are in some sense different people. That
is the simplest explanation of why an initial willingness to forego aid is not
definitive. But if the cyclist is a different person at the later time, then the cyclist at
the time of her original decision has harmed another person. The decision to run
the risk was not the original cyclist's "own" business.
It is all very well to suggest that the embezzler, the smoker, or the cyclist
may each be different people at different stages of their lives. What exactly makes
them different? To say that it is mere passage of time-to say that each of us is a
different person on every day of her life-would completely subvert our ordinary
notions of personhood. If the mere passage of time does not make the difference,
what is it? How do we decide whether the em~ezzler, for example, has changed in
such a way that she no longer deserves to be punished?
I would say, roughly, that the embezzler is a different person when we
discover her ten years later if she is no longer the sort of person who would
embezzle if placed in the same situation in which she did so originally. What this
means, of course, is far from clear. Many moralists, concerned about preserving
freedom of the will, might want to hold that the question "Would Jones, if placed
in the following situation, embezzle?" often has no well-defined answer. My
suggestion about retributive punishment seems to require that the question "Is
Jones the sort of person who, if placed in the following situation, would
embezzle?'' should have an answer. In that case, the second question, about what
sort of person Jones is, cannot be the same as the first question, about what Jones
would do. Perhaps the second question is about what Jones would probably do, or
would be strongly disposed to do, or might do without greatly surprising those who
knew Jones well, or something along those lines.
Assuming that further reflection would provide us with a satisfactory sense
of' 'the sort of person who ... , '' we now observe another important point. Our
embezzler may, after ten years, be the same person for some purposes and yet be a
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different person for other purposes. Thus, suppose that at the time she committed
embezzlement, the embezzler also committed an unrelated aggravated assault. It is
at least conceivable that after ten years the embezzler has grown much more
conscious of duties of trust without becoming any more disposed to control a
volatile temper that produces occasional physical aggression. In such a case, I
think we might hold it inappropriate to punish the embezzler now for her
embezzlement, but appropriate to punish her for the assault. 11
What about the cyclist who rides without a helmet? What makes her a
different person after her accident? The answer, I think, is that the cyclist is a
different person, in the relevant respect, if she is no longer the sort of person who
would ignore her future well-being for the sake of small increments of present
utility. Of course, it is not certain that having the accident will produce any such
change in the cyclist. But it seems likely to. In many cases, I should think, the
cyclist will not merely wish she had behaved differently in the past. She will have a
new appreciation of the virtue of prudence and will alter her attitude toward risk in
the future. If the cyclist changes in this way, she is a different person, who
deserves protection against the foolish behavior of her earlier self.
The reader may have noticed something odd about that last sentence. If the
cyclist learns prudence as the result of an accident, she may then be a person who
deserves protection, but it is too late to protect her. The harm she deserves to be
protected against has already occurred. Looking at the matter from the other end, if
we compel the imprudent original cyclist to wear a helmet, the other, prudent,
cyclist may never come into existence. Can we really interfere with the first cyclist
for the benefit of a later cyclist who may never exist and whose existence our
interference is intended to make less probable?
There are a number of questions here. Some of them arise because we do not
know whether the cyclist will be injured if she rides without a helmet and whether
she will become a new person if she suffers injury. In this essay I am generally
ignoring such questions. I am interested in how the situation looks to an ideal
paternalist. The ideal paternalist does know whether, if the cyclist rides without a
helmet, she will be injured, and he does know whether, if she is injured, she will
develop a new attitude to risk as a result.
Now, on the theory I am suggesting, there is no ground to interfere with the
cyclist unless she will both be injured and be changed by the experience. 12
Suppose that the ideal paternalist is confronted with a cyclist who will be injured, if
she rides without a helmet, and who will be changed. Can the ideal paternalist
intervene? The answer is still not obvious. We assume that if the paternalist
intervenes, the cyclist will not be injured and will not change. But this means that if
the paternalist intervenes, he will not be protecting any actual person. He will be
protecting a possible later self of the cyclist, whom he prevents by his intervention
from becoming actual. If he doesn't intervene, the possible person he could protect
will exist and will suffer the effects of a serious accident. But if he does intervene,
she will not exist at all.
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I think the ideal paternalist can intervene to protect the prudent cyclist, even
though she is only a possible person, whose existence the paternalist' s intervention
will prevent. What is appropriate to do on behalf of possible persons is a
complicated issue, and one that I shall not discuss at length even though perhaps I
should. There are two points that I think distinguish this case from others in which
intervention on behalf of possible persons seems more problematic. First, the
possible person the paternalist can protect here is one who will exist and suffer
unless the paternalist interferes with another agent's decision. This is quite
different from, say, the case of forbidding birth-control, where the possible person
on whose behalf we might act will not exist unless we interfere with the potential
parents' choice. It seems that we have more reason to act on behalf of possible
persons who will exist without our help than to act on behalf of possible persons
who need our help to exist in the first place. Second, the possible person we are
concerned with in the cyclist case, if she exists, will be connected by physical
continuity with an actual person (the original cyclist) who exists regardless of the
paternalist's decision. The possible person we are concerned with in this case is
unusually well-rooted in actuality, as possible persons go. She deserves protection.
One final point merits brief discussion. Let us refer to the view I have been
expounding, on which different temporal stages of one physically connected
"person" may be different persons for certain moral purposes, as the "time-slice
view.'' It might be urged against the time-slice view that agents have a greater
right to impose risks or harms on their future selves (or time-slices) than to impose
risks or harms on unconnected others. It is worth noting that this can be true
without destroying the force of the time-slice view as a defense of paternalism.
Most people think that there are situations in which it is wrong to impose harms on
unconnected others, even though the act imposing the harm would maximize
utility. If this is correct, it is a stronger principle against harming others than I think
the time-slice approach justifies with regard to one's future selves. I would not
suggest that an agent must not harm a future self even if overall utility is thereby
maximized. I would suggest only that an agent should not harm a future self and
diminish overall utility into the bargain, and that an agent who threatens this may
be prevented. Even that is enough to justify more paternalistic intervention than is
justified on the view that the agent should be left alone so long as she harms no one
but "herself," present or future.
It might be suggested, of course, that the position I have just indicated is
untenable. The argument goes as follows. If we believe that one person may not
harm another even though she thereby maximizes utility, and if we genuinely
regard future selves as other persons, we must be prepared to protect a future self
from harm by a present self even though the present self would maximize utility by
her choice. If we are not prepared to protect future selves in this way, we do not
truly regard them as other persons. That this argument is correct is not self-evident.
Might there not be different degrees of otherness, with different moral consequences? If that is held to be impossible-if all others must be treated the same as
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unconnected others-I think there is as much to be said for the view that
unconnected others should not be protected against acts that harm them but that
maximize utility, as there is to be said for the view that unconnected others deserve
a greater protection than this and that future selves deserve either the same greater
protection against the agent's present self or no protection at all.

IV
In the preceding section I suggested that we could prevent an imprudent cyclist
from riding without a helmet and harming a later, prudent, self. In effect, I
suggested that the earlier cyclist's choice should not be held to bind the later
cyclist. It is the inability of the earlier cyclist to bind the later that opens the way to
''paternalistic'' interference.
There is a different sort of case in which it is often suggested that the
justifiability of paternalistic interference depends precisely on the fact that a
person can bind herself. A standard example is the story of Odysseus and the
Sirens. I shall argue that attempts at self-binding are no more effective in cases of
this sort than they were in the cases of the preceding section. Paternalistic
interference that can be justified only by reference to self-binding decisions is not
justified at all.
Whereas the general tendency of the two preceding sections was to provide
new arguments in favor of paternalism, the general tendency of the present section
(not necessarily the only tendency, as we shall see) is to undercut an accepted
argument for paternalism.
Consider Odysseus. In order to be able to hear the Sirens' song without being
tempted to his death, Odysseus commands his crew to bind him to the mast of his
ship and not release him until the Sirens have been passed and left behind. It is
often suggested that even if, with the Sirens' song in his ears, Odysseus pleads to
be released, the crew are justified in ignoring his pleas because of his original
command. In brief, Odysseus' original command is regarded as binding him, and
as justifying the crew's protective action, until the command expires by its own
terms. 13
I agree that Odysseus' crew are right to keep him tied to the mast, even ifwe
consider only Odysseus' interests and not the crew's need for a captain. But if we
ask why the crew are right, Odysseus' command has very little to do with it. The
command has some relevance, for reasons I shall discuss below, but it is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rightness of the crew's behavior.
To see that the command is not a necessary condition, we have only to
suppose that Odysseus has not given the command, believing that he can sail by the
Sirens, listen to their song, and preserve himself by sheer strength of will. If
Odysseus has attempted this and is mistaken, and if the crew see him poised to
jump overboard and swim to his death, surely they are justified in stopping him,
tying him to the mast if need be, with no by-your-leave.
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To see that the command is not a sufficient condition, we must alter the facts
a bit more. Suppose that the Sirens' song casts no irresistible spell, but is merely
extremely beautiful. Suppose that the song is most beautiful when heard from near
the Sirens' isle, which is surrounded by dangerous rocks. And suppose that if
Odysseus swims to the rocks, he will not be killed but will suffer some physical
injury. Surely if we bring all these assumptions together in the right relation, we
can imagine a situation in which either swimming to the Sirens or not swimming to
them would be a choice a reasonable person might make. Suppose now that
Odysseus, approaching the Sirens' isle, decides he wants to sail by. Not trusting
himself to stick to this decision, he commands the crew to tie him to the mast, as in
the standard version of the tale. When he hears the Sirens' song, however, he
changes his mind, not because of any sinister compulsion in the Sirens' song, but
just because the song is more beautiful than he imagined, or because he discovers
that he cares more about hearing it than he realized. If we remember that the
decision to swim to the Sirens can be a reasonable one, then surely Odysseus is
entitled to change his mind. (If we like, we can hypothesize further that Odysseus
will have no other opportunity to hear the Sirens' song. It is now or never.) The
crew ought to release him, despite the earlier command.
If what I have just said is correct, the command is neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify the crew's decision to keep Odysseus aboard. What justifies
their decision in the standard version of the tale is the fact that swimming to the
Sirens is understood to be an irrational choice, with fatal consequences, made
under preternatural compulsion.
I shall say more about why Odysseus is entitled to change his mind, but first I
should tie up a loose end. I mentioned earlier that the command has some relevance
to what the crew should do. One reason is that, in practice, the crew do not know
Odysseus perfectly. Even if swimming to the Sirens would be reasonable for some
people, the crew must make a decision, when Odysseus asks to be released,
whether it is reasonable for him. We could understand their supposing that what
Odysseus thought before he was tied to the mast is important evidence concerning
what is reasonable for Odysseus now. In addition, if the crew decide wrongly not
to let Odysseus swim away when he wants to, they are less to blame if there was an
earlier command than if there was not. They can be more easily forgiven for
choosing incorrectly between Odysseus' inconsistent commands than for restraining him improperly on their own unprompted initiative.
If we set out to explain more fully why Odysseus is entitled to change his
mind, provided that his new decision is a reasonable one, we encounter a
difficulty. To speak of Odysseus' changing his mind seems to assume that
Odysseus is the same person throughout the episode we are considering. The
discussion of the preceding section, however, suggests the possibility that in
'' changing his mind'' Odysseus is really changing his identity. Does it matter how
we describe the change in Odysseus? Ultimately I do not think it matters, in this
kind of case, how we describe the change in Odysseus. I think the later choice,
whether it be of the original Odysseus or of a new one (and provided always that it

FREEDOM, IDENTITY, AND COMMITMENT

129

is a reasonable choice at the time it is made), should control. But the fact that we
can describe the change in Odysseus in two different ways complicates the issue.
Some people, I predict, will disagree with my conclusion and will believe both that
Odysseus does not change identity and that his not changing is an essential part of
the explanation why his first choice should control. Others will disagree with my
conclusion but will believe that Odysseus does change and will believe that his
changing is an essential part of the reason that his first choice should control. I
shall deal with both positions in tum.
First, on the assumption that Odysseus is the same person, is he entitled to
change his mind? Many people seem to have the intuition that someone may
reasonably want to bind herself for the future by a present decision, and that
provided we really are talking about a single person-that is, about a present
person binding a future person who is still herself-such self-binding decisions
ought to be recognized and, where appropriate, enforced.
My intuition runs the other way, and I see two general reasons that support
the freedom to change one's mind. One reason is that, other things being equal, the
later decision is likely to be a better one. The agent is likely to have more
information and to have had more time to reflect on her goals. To be sure, the first
decision may have been better. It may have been more carefully considered, or the
agent may simply have forgotten something important in the time between the
decisions. Nonetheless, in the absence of extrinsic evidence about which decision
is more deliberate or better-informed, the mere passage of time suggests
considerations which favor the second.
In addition, allowing changes of mind will tend to develop strength of
purpose, part of which is precisely the ability to resist vacillation without outside
help. I have suggested before that we might sometimes want to let an individual do
something foolish, which would harm her in the future, in order to encourage her
to develop the ability to make good choices. I now suggest that we may want to
inform the agent that we will not, despite her present request, undertake to prevent
her doing something foolish, or rather something she currently regards as foolish,
in the future. She should master herself. Her fate is in her own hands.
The reasons I have suggested for allowing changes of mind may seem
significant but not overwhelming. ls there anything more to say? It is natural to
look for examples, discussion of which will move possessors of the conflicting
intuitions closer to agreement. Unfortunately, it is not easy to produce examples
that shed light on the question. Most examples that present the question seem
merely to present it, without illuminating it. Perhaps it is worth mentioning some
legal examples, since they are a sort of example about which we have codified
views (though not necessarily correct ones). We allow people to revoke or rewrite
wills. We allow people to retract offers before they are accepted. Even after an
offer has been accepted and a contract formed, we allow the contracting parties to
modify the contract or rescind it by mutal agreement. Legislatures, persons of a
sort, can repeal legislation. I could go on.
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Unfortunately, listing cases in which we allow changes of mind suggests a
similar list of cases in which we do not. If there are revocable licenses, there are
irrevocable licenses also, often in the form of easements. There are revocable, but
also irrevocable, trusts. Gifts, once completed, are irrevocable by the donor.
Offers become contracts upon acceptance, binding the offeror unless she is
released by the offeree. On a higher level, one might suggest that a constitution
embodies decisions by which the whole body politic binds itself.
If we ask what distinguishes decisions that are revocable from decisions that
are not, the proponent of the intuition that favors self-binding is apt to suggest that
the crucial factor is precisely whether the decision is intended to be self-binding.
When a decision is intended to be self-binding, it is.
The truth of the matter is complex, and whether one intends to bind oneself is
no doubt relevant to whether one actually does so. But I think an intent to bind
oneself is far from a sufficient condition for self-binding. I cannot discuss all the
examples at length. I shall comment briefly on two of them.
Regarding constitutions, the key point is that a constitution is not ordinarily
intended to bind (or at least does not ordinarily bind) the same entity that adopts it.
A constitution is adopted by the people at large for the purpose of binding the
organs of day-to-day government. The people at large, who adopt the constitution,
can always change their minds by amending it. 14
Contracts are different. A contract does bind the agent who enters into it. It is
tempting to say that a party to a contract is bound only because someone else's
interests are involved. If this were a fully adequate explanation of the bindingness
of contracts, the contract case could be dismissed as bearing no analogy at all to the
case of Odysseus. Unfortunately, I do not think the proponent of Odysseus'
freedom to change his mind can rest here. The bindingness of a contract is not fully
explained just by saying someone else's interests are involved. Someone else's
interests are involved because people rely on contracts. People rely on contracts in
part because contracts are known to be binding. In short, bindingness and reliance
are a package, and must be explained together. Not until we have the right
explanation of the package can we be sure that the reason contracts bind, whatever
it is, does not cover Odysseus' decision as well.
The believer in effective self-binding might now suggest that we make
contracts binding because the agent who enters a contract benefits from being able
to bind herself. Her ability to bind herself is the prerequisite to her getting
something she wants. In the contract case, to be sure, being able to bind herself is a
prerequisite to getting something she wants from the other party. But there might
be cases in which ability to bind herself is a prerequisite to her getting something
she wants even though no other party is involved. Remember Odysseus: When he
asks to be bound to the mast, he wants not to swim to the Sirens. The only way he
can be certain of achieving this is by having himself bound and having a crew who
will ignore any change of mind. If we make contracts binding so that people can
get what they want from other parties, why not make purely self-regarding
decisions binding (when they are intended to be binding) so that people can get
what they want (at the time of the decisions) from themselves?
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One possible answer to the question just posed is that there is a difference in
the way self-binding is ''necessary'' in the contract case and in the self-regarding
case. Odysseus could get what he wants when he tries to bind himself simply by
being strong-willed and by not changing his mind. In the contract case, it is not
enough that one not change one's mind; the other party needs to know that one will
not, or cannot effectively, change one's mind.
There is another difference between the two cases, not necessarily deeper,
but more interesting. The standard contract case we call to mind to justify our
belief that contracts should be binding simply does not involve a change of mind,
or even a threatened change of mind, of the kind that occurs in the Odysseus case. I
shall explain: Generally speaking, the reciprocal obligations of a contract are
performed by the parties at different times. (This is not invariably true, but if
contractual performances were always exchanged contemporaneously, we would
have much less use for contracts than we have.) The most obvious case in which
one party would like not to be bound by her contract is the case in which the other
party has performed and she has not. But here it is entirely the time-displacement
that accounts for this party's "change of mind." There has been no change in her
beliefs or her interests. She just wants to get something for nothing. If we view the
transaction as a whole, it is as much in her interest at the later time when she wants
out as it was when the contract was made. The question of whether she should be
able to "change her mind" does not arise in the form in which it arises regarding
Odysseus.
To be sure, the desire to breach one's contract may result from a genuine
change of mind about the transaction as a whole. The party who wishes to breach
may be willing to return what she has received under the contract, if that is
possible. In this case, ifwe hold her to the contract, we will prevent an Odysseuslike change of mind. But it is not a desire to prevent Odysseus-like changes of
mind, and it is not this case, that leads us to accept the idea of binding contracts in
the first place. If people's beliefs and preferences were generally so volatile that
Odysseus-like changes of mind were the commonest reason for wanting to break
contracts, we would have a very different doctrine of contract from what we have.
We would enforce many fewer contracts. Instead of encouraging reliance, and
protecting it by making contracts binding, we would save people from relying to
their detriment by making it clear in advance that enforcement was not the norm.
The doctrine we have, and our standard intuitions about contract, depend on the
fact that in ordinary cases parties do not change their minds in the way Odysseus
does. For that reason, the contract analogy does not suggest that Odysseus should
be forbidden to change his mind.
The lesson of the legal examples is ambiguous, but I believe that in the end
these examples neither undermine my arguments in favor of freedom to change
one's mind nor cast doubt on the intuition that freedom to change one's mind, even
after a decision intended to be binding, is the "normal" state of affairs.
I have been arguing that Odysseus should be able to change his mind,
provided his later choice is a reasonable one, on the assumption that he is at all
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relevant times the same person. I tum now to the suggestion that Odysseus is not
the same person if he changes his mind, and to the claim that, precisely because
Odysseus is not the same person, his later self should not be able to undo what his
earlier self hoped to accomplish. Actually, this suggestion seems quite implausible
in the case of Odysseus. I shall therefore consider a somewhat different example,
in which the suggestion has more appeal. The example is Derek Parfit's: "Let us
take a nineteenth-century Russian who, in several years, should inherit vast
estates. Because he has socialist ideals, he intends, now, to give the land to the
peasants. But he knows that in time his ideals may fade. To guard against this
possibility he does two things. He first signs a legal document, which will
automatically give away the land, and which can only be revoked with his wife's
consent. He then says to his wife, 'Ifl ever change my mind, and ask you to revoke
this document, promise me that you will not consent.' '' 15 I shall call the Russian
"Boris." Suppose that as Boris gets older, his ideals do fade. When he inherits the
estates, he wishes to keep them. He asks his wife's consent to the revocation of the
original document. What should his wife do? Parfit suggests that we can view the
older Boris as a different person from the idealistic young Boris who signed the
document. If we do, the older Boris's request cannot release the wife from her
commitment to the young Boris. The young Boris no longer exists. There is no
living person by whom the wife can be released.
Parfit suggests that the commitment is unreleasable. He does not say that
because the commitment is unreleasable it must be honored. Parfit is primarily
concerned, at this point in his essay, to establish the possibility of viewing the
older Boris as a different person from the younger. The general tendency of his
essay, as I read it, would support the weakening of all obligations based on
commitments. Nonetheless, it could be suggested that the unreleasable commitment to the young Boris is a binding commitment, which should lead the wife to
refuse the older Boris's request. This view I shall call the "rigorist" view.
Note that the rigorist view presupposes Parfit's approach to personal identity
(which I share) and applies to cases in which there is an actual change of identity
between an earlier and a later occupant of the same body. The rigorist view is quite
consistent with the view that so long as there is no change of identity, an agent
should be able to change her mind and to release others from commitments to her.
Thus, one who holds the rigorist view may believe that in our earlier example,
Odysseus can change his mind. This raises a question. Suppose that Odysseus says
to his crew: "Bind me, and do not release me. If I ask to be released, ignore me.
The request to be released will be proof that I have changed, and that my thenexisting self cannot release you from the commitment you now give me." If the
crew must accept Odysseus' claim that any change of mind would represent a
change of identity, the rigorist view entails that Odysseus can always bind himself
firmly, so long as he uses the right formula. I take it, however, that if we accept the
rigorist view, the question of whether the original Odysseus has been replaced by a
new one is not to be settled simply on the basis of what Odysseus at any time says.
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What Odysseus says is significant. His assertions about which of his beliefs or
preferences or ideals are essential to his identity cannot be ignored. But his
assertions, even his sincere assertions, are not conclusive.
So much for description of the rigorist view. Is it reasonable? Why, when the
older Boris asks his wife to revoke the document, should she care about her
commitment to the young Boris at all? The young Boris no longer exists. He can
neither enjoy nor even be aware of the satisfaction of his preferences. Why should
his preferences, or the commitment to him, count?
In response we might note that people frequently have preferences about
what happens after their death or, more generally, about what happens without
their knowledge. It is not easy to explain why the satisfaction of such preferences
should not be regarded as valuable without falling into a theory which locates all
value in mental states. I shall not argue that the preferences of the "deceased"
young Boris should not count at all. On the other hand, they might count without
counting as heavily as the preferences of the Boris who is still alive. This would
tend to undercut the rigorist view. I think there are reasons for devaluing the young
Boris's preferences, at least in this case.
Parfit suggests by implication that the wife's promise to the young Boris is
like a deathbed promise to a parent to help his or her children. 16 Certainly the
promises are alike in that the promisors cannot be released. But they are very
different in another respect. The promise to the dying parent is to help the children.
The promise to the young Boris is to oppose Boris the Old. (It might be suggested
that the promise to the young Boris is a promise to help the peasants. In a general
analysis of whether to keep the promise, that would surely be relevant. But it does
not eliminate the difference between the promise to the parent and the promise to
Boris that I wish to focus on.) On the face of it, a deceased's preference that the
goals of his or her survivors (which we assume are reasonable and morally
permissible goals) be opposed seems entitled to less weight than a deceased's
preference that the goals of her or his survivors be furthered.
Young Boris is unlike the dying parent because there is a conflict between
the goals of the younger Boris and the older. Suppose that we ask directly which
Boris ought to prevail. To say that the older ought to prevail just because he is alive
might beg the question, although I am not sure it would be a mistake. There may,
however, be another way to look at the matter. It would not be implausible to
suggest that if the wife honors her promise to the young Boris, she will hann the
older Boris. "Harm" is a problematic concept. It might be said that merely not
inheriting vast estates cannot be a harm. On the other hand, if we say that the older
Boris is deprived of his patrimony, that does sound like harm. At least, the use of
the word' 'harm'' is not implausible. It is much less plausible, however, to say that
if the wife gives in to the older Boris, she harms the younger. Even if postmortem
preferences (preferences about what happens after one's death) count, it does not
seem that the dissatisfaction of one's postmortem preferences can be a harm.
Harms are peculiarly grievous losses. Death may not close the accounts on a life
completely (and it does not if postmortem preferences matter), but death arguably
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puts one beyond the reach of really serious loss. If one way of resolving the conflict
between the younger and the older Boris imposes what can plausibly be regarded
as a harm, and if the other way does not, should not the latter way (favoring the
older Boris) be preferred?
Once we emphasize the fact that the young Boris's specific intention is to
oppose the preferences of a later person, we cannot help but see that the
proliferation of binding and unreleasable commitments of this sort would be
undesirable. One response, short of abandoning the rigorist view, would be to
weaken our view of the bindingness of commitments generally. If we wish to
retain the idea that commitments are strongly binding and that commitments such
as that to the young Boris are as binding as any others, then surely there is a
different concession we must make. We must admit that such commitments should
not be undertaken lightly, and often should not be undertaken at all.
It is tempting to say that Boris's wife is free to promise what the young Boris
asks if she chooses to. After all, it is only Boris's interests that are affected. But
this will not do. There may be two Borises. Indeed, the young Boris's request
makes sense only because he fears that there will be another Boris, whose interests
he wishes to prejudice in advance. In these circumstances, Boris's wife is not free
to give her promise just because the young Boris asks for it.
The wife might perhaps give a promise limited to the "life" of the young
Boris. Such a promise could not become unreleasable. But then, such a promise
could not accomplish what the young Boris wants.
The final point against the young Boris and the rigorist view is this. If the
older Boris exists (as a person different from the young Boris), and if the rigorist
view is rejected, then the older Boris will have certain interests of the young Boris
within his control, to the young Boris's detriment. But the young Boris has it
largely within his control whether the older Boris exists at all. Young Boris can
murder Old Boris in his cradle ifhe will merely develop the strength to maintain his
own convictions. That opportunity, surely, is all young Boris deserves.
In sum, where no unconnected person's interests are affected, neither the
agent who changes his mind (Odysseus) nor the agent who changes his identity
(Boris) ought to be bound at a later time by an earlier choice. 17

V
The arguments of this essay obviously justify no simple conclusion. I do have
some final comments.
First, I would emphasize that the freedom-maximization argument of
section II and the time-slice argument of section III are independent, even though
they may seem most appealing as applied to the same range of cases, involving
smokers, motorcyclists, and so on. Some readers may find themselves inclined to
meld the two arguments into a third argument to the effect that we can interfere
with the smoker, for example, in order to prevent a loss of freedom to the smoker's
later, different, self. This argument differs from my time-slice argument if it
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assumes that the only relevant harms to later selves are losses of freedom, and it
differs from my freedom-maximization argument in assuming the time-slice view
of personal identity. There is in fact some conflict between the general tendencies
of the freedom-maximization argument and the time-slice argument. The timeslice argument breaks people down into successive selves and emphasizes
discontinuities, whereas the very notion of freedom seems to require some degree
of continuity, of integration of personality over time.
If we compare the time-slice argument of section III with the argument
against the possibility of binding self-regarding commitments in section IV, there
is an apparent similarity. In both cases, it seems, the later self (or else the later
decision of a continuing selt) prevails. But the parallel is not perfect. Under the
time-slice view of section III, as I have described it, the later self does not prevail if
the earlier self wishes to make a choice that, although it harms the later self,
maximizes utility. The point of the time-slice argument is not that the later self
always prevails. The point is that the later self counts, and deserves some
protection against the earlier. In situations in which we are considering whether to
enforce a commitment intended to be self-binding, the later self does prevail. The
reason, roughly, is that the earlier self needs help to achieve its goals (unlike the
earlier self in a motorcycle case, which needs only to be let alone), and because the
earlier self has no persuasive claim to our help once its time has passed.
The argument of section IV can be viewed as one of freedom-maximization,
like the argument of section II, but again there are differences. The argument of
section II is primarily designed to maximize freedom as range of choice. The
argument of section IV seems more likely to maximize freedom as ability to
choose, by encouraging people to develop strength of will. In section IV, the range
of choice the later Odysseus gains if we refuse to regard commitments as binding
seems essentially the same as the range of choice the earlier Odysseus loses. It
could be argued, of course, that the later Odysseus gains more than the earlier
Odysseus loses. The later Odysseus gains a freedom to jump overboard, while the
earlier Odysseus loses only the freedom to bind himself not to jump overboard,
which may seem less worthy. Similarly, the freedom gained by the later Odysseus
may count for more than the freedom lost by the earlier if, as I have suggested,
there is some general reason to count the interests of those who are present (at the
time when our decision must be made) more heavily than the interests of those who
are past. Perhaps it is the timing of the decision about intervention that accounts
more than anything else for the different feel of section II cases and section IV
cases. But some difference there certainly is.
The arguments of all four of the preceding sections reveal that the sources of
our difficulty about paternalism are more various than is usually recognized. The
sources are at least three. One source is the conflict between freedom and other
values, such as pleasure or happiness. A second source is the complexity of what
we value as freedom, which includes both range of choice and ability to choose
rationally and effectively. A third source is the discrepancy between the ideal and
the actual. We have an ideal of a person who is both rational at each moment and
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integrated over time. Actual people are neither. The question arises: Ought we to
treat actual people as if they embodied the ideal, or ought we to intervene in their
lives in hopes of bringing them closer to the ideal in the future?
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might produce retrospective consent, so retrospective consent is not sufficient. It might be objected that
brainwashing would not produce a "free" retrospective consent, and that a free retrospective consent
would be sufficient. This is certainly the most plausible claim that can be made for the necessity or
sufficiency of retrospective consent, but it still fails. Consider an Odysseus case, in which either
swimming to the Sirens or not might be reasonable. Suppose that when the ship is sailing past the
Sirens, Odysseus wants to swim to the Sirens but the crew, on their own initiative, restrain him. Some
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aesthetic pleasure and physical integrity, and he thanks the crew for having held him back. This
announcement by itself does not establish that the crew were right. To be sure, retrospective consent
may be relevant, for some of the same reasons as prospective consent. But it is not determinative. Nor
does the time-slice view of the previous section suggest that retrospective consent settles the issue in the
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the agent, and whether the agent will come to be glad to have been prevented from performing the act,
are related but distinct questions.

